STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

MAINE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
DOCKET NO. BTA-2016-03

[CORPORATE TAXPAYER],
Petitioner
v.

DECISION

MAINE REVENUE SERVICES,
Respondent
[Corporate Taxpayer] (“the Company”) appeals from Maine Revenue Services’
(“MRS’s”) denial of its request for reimbursement of personal property taxes that it paid for
April 1, [year 3], through March 31, [year 4] (“Property Tax Year [year 3]”). Based upon the
evidence presented and the applicable law, we reverse MRS’s denial of the Company’s
reimbursement request.
I.

Background

This appeal concerns the right to receive property tax reimbursement under the Business
Equipment Tax Reimbursement (“BETR”) program, 36 M.R.S. §§ 6651-65, upon the demise of
the subject business equipment.
At all relevant times, the Company was a [non-Maine] corporation doing business in
[town], Maine (the “Town”). In October [year 5], the Company filed its application with MRS
for reimbursement under the BETR program of personal property tax in the amount of $[amount]
that it paid to the Town in [year 4] for tax that it owed regarding a certain article of business
equipment (the “Equipment”) for Property Tax Year [year 3].1 MRS denied the Company’s

Under the BETR program, a reimbursement application must be filed with MRS between “August 1st and . . . the
following December 31st for property taxes paid during the preceding calendar year.” 36 M.R.S. § 6654 (emphasis
added).
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reimbursement request and subsequently reaffirmed its denial on reconsideration. This appeal
followed.
A brief chronological summary of events is helpful to an understanding of this complex
case:
•

By deed dated [date, year 1], and recorded in the [Maine] County Registry of Deeds in
Book [number], Page [number],2 [the Company’s predecessor] transferred to the
Company the land, buildings, and appurtenances located in the Town, including the
Equipment.

•

The Company never used the Equipment, but maintained it in usable condition at all
relevant times. The Equipment was housed in a building (the “Building”) that had been
specially built to accommodate the Equipment. The Building was part of a larger
business complex, also owned by the Company, of which the Company never made
business use.

•

For Property Tax Years [year 1] and [year 2], the Company applied for and received
BETR reimbursement from MRS for taxes that it paid to the Town regarding the
Equipment.

•

At some point in [year 4], the Company paid the personal property taxes for the
Equipment that were assessed by the Town for Property Tax Year [year 3].

•

From November [year 3], through November [year 4], the Company attempted to sell the
Equipment, both with and without a lease arrangement for the Building.

•

On [date, year 4], the Company offered the Equipment for sale at a public auction,
without success.

2

We take official notice of this public record, which neither party provided to the Board on appeal. 18-674 C.M.R.
ch. 100, § 203(5).
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•

Subsequently in [year 4], the Company transferred ownership of the Equipment to a sister
entity, a [non-Maine] limited liability company (the “LLC”), and on [date, year 4], the
LLC contracted to sell the Equipment to a commercial salvage company (the “Scrap
Dealer”) as scrap metal. The LLC reserved the right to sell the Equipment pending
demolition, and in fact a purchase offer was made on November [day, year 4], several
days after the LLC transferred ownership of the Equipment to the Scrap Dealer.
However, no sale resulted.

•

In February [year 5], the Scrap Dealer took possession of the Equipment by dismantling
it and removing it from the Building.
In October [year 5], the Company filed its application with MRS under the Business

Equipment Tax Reimbursement (“BETR”) program for reimbursement of personal property
taxes regarding the Equipment, assessed by the Town against the Company for [year 3] and paid
to the Town by the Company in [year 4]. After review, MRS denied the Company’s
reimbursement request on the ground that
the facility [where the Equipment was located] permanently ceased all productive
operations prior to April 1, [year 3][,] [n]o productive operations were taking
place at the facility within 12 months prior to the date reimbursement was
requested, and the facility was not being advertised as available for sale or lease
within that time.
MRS’s denial of BETR reimbursement dated [date] (paraphrasing the BETR exclusionary
provisions of 36 M.R.S. § 6662).
An Appeals Conference was conducted pursuant to 18-674 C.M.R. ch. 100 § 201(3)
(Board Rule section 201(3)), after which MRS asserted for the first time a new ground for
denying the Company’s BETR reimbursement request. Specifically, MRS now also contends
that because the Company transferred the Equipment to the LLC prior to August 1, [year 5], the
3

Company is disentitled to its right to reimbursement under 36 M.R.S. § 6652(1) (providing for
successor eligibility). The Company responds that it would be unfair to permit MRS to assert a
new basis for its position that MRS did not raise during its reconsideration process under 36
M.R.S. § 151. The Company also maintains that it was in full compliance with the requirements
of the BETR program and is entitled to reimbursement of the property tax listed in its request.
The Company has the burden of showing that it is more likely than not that MRS erred in
denying its reimbursement request. 36 M.R.S. § 151-D(10)(F).
II.

Discussion

With certain exceptions not applicable here, Maine property tax law provides that “all
personal property of residents of [Maine] and all personal property within [Maine] of persons not
residents of the State is subject to taxation on the first day of each April . . . .” 36 M.R.S. § 502.
In 1995, the Legislature enacted the BETR program, Chapter 915 of Title 36, Maine Revised
Statutes, to stimulate capital investment in business equipment by means of a property tax
incentive. Id. § 6659. 3 Under BETR, “[a] person against whom [municipal property] taxes have
been assessed . . . with respect to eligible property4 and who has paid those taxes is entitled to
reimbursement of a portion of those taxes from the State . . . .” Id. § 6652(1).
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In full, the Legislative Findings provision of the BETR program states as follows:
The Legislature finds that encouragement of the growth of capital investment in this State is in the
public interest and promotes the general welfare of the people of the State. The Legislature further
finds that the high cost of owning qualified business property in this State is a disincentive to the
growth of capital investment in this State. The Legislature further finds that the program set forth
in this chapter is a reasonable means of overcoming this disincentive and will encourage capital
investment in this State.

36 M.R.S. § 6659.
In relevant part, “eligible property” under the BETR program is defined as depreciable tangible personal property
“used or held for use exclusively for a business purpose by the person in possession of it . . . .” 36 M.R.S. §
6651(1), (3).
4

4

In the present case, we find that the Equipment meets the definition of eligible property
under the BETR program and, further, that the Company was assessed and paid the personal
property taxes with respect to the Equipment. We therefore conclude, absent any disqualifying
factors or events, that the Company is entitled to reimbursement of the property taxes as set forth
in its BETR request.
A.

Denial of BETR under 36 M.R.S. § 6662
Following the original 1995 enactment of BETR, the Legislature imposed the following

limitation which became effective on September 21, 2001:
Reimbursement under this chapter may not be made for property tax payments
made with respect to property located at a facility that has permanently ceased all
productive operations on April 1st of the year for which the property taxes are
assessed and where no productive operations have been conducted for at least 12
months before the date that reimbursement is requested. . . .
36 M.R.S. § 6662. At the same time, the legislature qualified that limitation with the
following exception:
This section does not apply if the owner of the facility has publicly advertised that
the facility is available for sale or lease and has made a good faith effort to market
and sell or lease the facility to prospective buyers or lessees.
Id. It is the above-quoted limitation (which formed the basis for MRS’s denial of the Company’s
request for BETR reimbursement) and the above-quoted exception to the limitation that are at
issue here. We consider each in turn.
1.

The Section 6662 Limitation

Under the facts of this case, unless an exception applies, 36 M.R.S. § 6662 provides that
BETR reimbursement is unavailable if two conditions are met: (1) the Equipment was located at a
“facility” that had “permanently ceased all productive operations” as April 1, [year 3], and (2) no
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productive operations were conducted at the facility for 12 months prior to the Company’s
October [year 5] BETR reimbursement request.
When construing a statute, our purpose is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. To
determine the legislative intent,
we look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, and we construe that
language to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results. In addition to
examining the plain language, we also consider the whole statutory scheme of
which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result, presumably the
intent of the Legislature, may be achieved.
Schaefer v. State Tax Assessor, 2008 ME 148, ¶ 7, 956 A.2d 710 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “Only if the language of a statute is ambiguous will we look beyond it to the
legislative history or other external indicia of legislative intent.” Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd. v.
State Tax Assessor, 2005 ME 96, ¶ 8, 879 A.2d 15.
The term “facility” is not defined in Chapter 915. When construing a statutory term that
is undefined in the statute itself, the Maine courts “often rely on the definitions provided in
dictionaries” to determine the plain meaning of the term. Apex Custom Lease Corp. v. State Tax
Assessor, 677 A.2d 530, 533 (Me. 1996) (citations omitted). The dictionary defines a “facility”
as “something (as a hospital, machinery, plumbing) that is built, constructed, installed, or
established to perform some particular function or to serve or facilitate some particular end.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 812-813 (3rd
ed. 1993). Both parties to this appeal agree that the Equipment at issue was located at a
“facility” on April 1, [year 3],5 and, further, both parties agree that the facility at which the

MRS contends that the “facility” at which the Equipment was located was the entire defunct business complex in
which the Equipment was located, while the Company contends that the subject “facility” was the Building located
at that complex. Under either of these contentions, the analysis and the result of whether the facility had
“permanently” ceased productive operations is the same.
5
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Equipment was located had “ceased all productive operations” as of that April 1st date.6 The
parties disagree, however, on whether the facility had “permanently ceased all productive
operations” as of April 1, [year 3], within the meaning of section 6662. Specifically, the
Company argues that productive operations had not “permanently” ceased because the
Equipment could be restarted at any time.
The term “permanent” is not defined in Chapter 915. However, the dictionary defines the
term “permanent” as “continuing or enduring (as in the same state, status, place) without
fundamental or marked change: not subject to alteration or fluctuation: fixed, or intended to be
fixed; lasting, stable.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
Unabridged 1683 (3rd ed. 1993).7 We find that by its the reference in section 6662 to a “facility
that has permanently ceased all productive operations on April 1st of the year for which the
property taxes are assessed and where no productive operations have been conducted for at least
12 months before the date that reimbursement is requested,” the Legislature clearly expressed its
intention to limit reimbursement under the BETR program and clearly described the parameters
of that limitation. In this case, the Company has not shown that the facility at which the
Equipment was located had not “permanently ceased all productive operations” as of April 1,
[year 3]. Accordingly, we find—absent any applicable exception—that BETR reimbursement is
correctly disallowed under the limitation provision of section 6662.

6

The parties also agree that no productive operations were conducted at the facility between October [day, year 4],
and October [day, year 5], which is the second prong of section 6662’s disqualification provision.
We note that the term “permanently” is not synonymous with the term “perpetual.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1684 (3rd ed. 1993) (“continuing forever: everlasting,
eternal, unceasing”).
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2.

The Exception to Limitation

The BETR reimbursement limitation described above does not apply where “the owner of
the facility [at which the BETR-eligible property is located] has publicly advertised that the
facility is available for sale or lease and has made a good faith effort to market and sell or lease
the facility to prospective buyers or lessees.” 36 M.R.S. § 6662 (emphasis added). Under the
exception provision, the term “facility” is ambiguous, that is, “susceptible to more than one
meaning.” Hebron Acad., Inc. v. Town of Hebron, 2013 ME 15 ¶ 8, 60 A.3d 774. It may be, as
MRS contends, that the exception requires the advertisement and attempted sale or lease of the
entire business complex located in [Town], or, as argued by the Company, that the provision
requires advertisement and a good faith effort to sell or lease the Building at that complex that
housed and provided functional support for the Equipment. Neither the dictionary nor the
legislative history provides guidance preferring either position, however the context of the
“whole statutory scheme of which the section at issue forms a part” supports a finding, and we so
find, that the term “facility” as used in section 6662 refers to the Building—“built, constructed,
installed, [and] established to perform [the] particular function” of supporting the Equipment’s
use—and not the entire business complex upon which the Equipment was incidentally but not
functionally located. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
Unabridged 812-813 (3rd ed. 1993).
From November [year 3] through November [year 4], the Company advertised the
Equipment for sale, with or without a lease arrangement regarding the Building. Prospective
purchasers toured the premises where the Equipment was located and inspected the Equipment.
The Company also maintained the Equipment in functional condition so as to be able to market
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and sell it as an operational whole. We conclude that the Company advertised and “made a good
faith effort to market and sell or lease the facility” where the Equipment was located, within the
meaning of the exception provision of section 6662. Consequently, section 6662 does not
deprive the Company of reimbursement for the personal property taxes as applied for under the
BETR program.
Finally, MRS argues that because the exclusionary provision of section 6662 requires the
subject facility to be idle for “at least 12 months before the date that reimbursement is
requested,” the exception provision of section 6662 carries an implicit, identical timeframe
within which the Company was required to advertise the facility for sale or lease. Specifically,
MRS contends that for the exception under section 6662 to apply, the Company must have
publicly advertised the facility for sale or lease and made a good faith effort to market and sell or
lease the facility between October [day, year 4] and October [day, year 5], when the Company
requested BETR reimbursement. MRS argues that because the Company’s marketing efforts
predated October [day, year 4], the Company is not entitled to the benefit of the exception. We
disagree.
“[W]e do not read exceptions, limitations, or conditions into an otherwise clear and
unambiguous statute.” Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME 123, ¶ 9, 930 A.2d 1088 (citations omitted).
Had the Legislature intended to prescribe a timeframe within which action must occur under the
exception provision of section 6662, it could have simply stated one, or it could have adopted by
reference the timeframe described in the limitation section of section 6662, immediately
preceding. Instead, however, the Legislature chose to impose a “good faith effort” requirement
to the exception, which we hereby acknowledge to be reasonable and appropriate when
addressing an attempted sale of property under the circumstances described in section 6662.
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Because the actions of the Company come within the exception provided under section
6662, we hold that the exclusion provisions of that section do not operate to deprive the
Company of its entitlement to BETR reimbursement as requested.8
B.

Denial of BETR under 36 M.R.S. § 6652(1)
MRS raises for the first time on appeal that 36 M.R.S. § 6652(1) operates to deprive the

Company of BETR reimbursement in this case. The Company argues that it is unfair, at this
stage of the proceedings, to allow MRS to present a new basis for denying its request for BETR
reimbursement.
As we recently discussed in Corporate Taxpayer v. Me. Revenue Servs., BTA-2015-17
(Me. Bd. Tax App. Jun. 20, 2016), the Board serves as a forum of origin regarding MRS’s
determination on reconsideration. As such, the scope of the Board’s review is not limited to “the
issues identified by the parties on MRS reconsideration.” Id. at 6. See also Board Rule section
202(1) (recommended decision to resolve “all material issues in the appeal”). We therefore
overrule the Company’s objection and proceed to address the merits of the MRS’s argument.
Section 6652(1) provides in pertinent part that
[a] successor in interest of a person against whom taxes have been assessed with
respect to eligible property is entitled to reimbursement pursuant to this section,
whether the tax was paid by the person assessed or by the successor, as long as a
transfer of the property in question to the successor has occurred and the
successor is the owner of the property as of August 1st of the year in which a
claim for reimbursement may be filed pursuant to section 6654. For purposes of
this subsection, “successor in interest” includes the initial successor and any
subsequent successor. When an eligible successor in interest exists, the successor
is the only person to whom reimbursement under this chapter may be made with
respect to the transferred property.
Id. (emphasis added). The term “successor in interest” is not defined in Chapter 915, however
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term as meaning “one who follows another in ownership or
We also note that on or about November [day, year 4], within the window urged by MRS, the Company’s
marketing efforts produced an offer to purchase the Equipment.
8
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control of property.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1570 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, under the facts of this
case, the LLC, as the owner of the Equipment when it entered into the Contract with the Scrap
Dealer on [date, year 4], was a successor in interest to the Company on that date. The question
remains, however, whether section 6652(1) disentitles the Company of its requested BETR
reimbursement under these circumstances. We find that it does not.
We initially recognize that section 6652(1) does not operate to deprive a claimant from
BETR reimbursement but rather operates to identify the proper claimant. Consistent with, and in
furtherance of the legislative purpose set forth in section 6659, the successor-in-interest
provision of section 6652(1) ensures that the reimbursement is paid to the current owner or user
of the qualified business property. Cf. id. § 6661 (“A lessor of eligible property shall pay over to
the lessee . . . reimbursement of property taxes received by the lessor . . . to the extent that the
lessor has been reimbursed . . . by the lessee.”). In the present case, section 6652(1) directs that
BETR reimbursement must be paid only to the successor “[w]hen an eligible successor in
interest exists.” We may not ignore the word “eligible” when construing the language of section
6652(1). See, e.g., Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 2001 ME 11 ¶ 9, 765 A.2d
566 (“Words must be given meaning and not treated as meaningless and superfluous.”);
Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 33 ¶ 21, 898 A.2d 408 (“[W]e will not treat
any provision of a statute as surplusage when a reasonable construction of a statute can provide
meaning to each provision.”). The question becomes whether an eligible successor exists under
the facts of the present case, and whether section 6652(1) is therefore applicable.
The existence of an “eligible” successor in interest entitled to BETR reimbursement
under section 6659(1) depends upon two requirements: (1) a transfer of the property in question
to the successor must have occurred, and (2) the successor must be the owner of the property as
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of August 1st of the year in which a claim for reimbursement may be filed pursuant to section
6654. The evidence presented supports a finding that the Company transferred ownership of the
Equipment to the LLC on or before [date, year 4], the date that the LLC entered into the Contract
with the Scrap Dealer. However, the evidence does not support a finding that the LLC was the
owner of the Equipment on August 1, [year 5]. Rather, the evidence shows that the Equipment
ceased to exist prior to August 1, [year 5], and that there was no eligible successor in interest
within the meaning of section 6652(1) in October [year 5], when the Company requested BETR
reimbursement. There is no provision of the BETR law that deprives the Company of
reimbursement under the facts presented. Therefore, in accordance with the legislative purpose
set forth in section 6659, we reverse MRS’s denial of the Company’s request for reimbursement
under the BETR program.
III.

Decision

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse MRS’s denial of the Company’s request for
BETR reimbursement of property tax paid for Property Tax Year [year 3].
The Board may, in limited circumstances, reconsider its decision on any appeal. If either
party wishes to request reconsideration, that party must file a written request with the Board
within 20 days of receiving this decision. Contact the Appeals Office at 207-287-2864 or see the
Board’s rules, available at http://www.maine.gov/boardoftaxappeals/lawsrules/, for more
information on when the Board may grant reconsideration. If no motion for reconsideration is
filed within 20 days of the date of this proposed decision, it will become the Board’s final
administrative action. If either party wishes to appeal the Board’s decision in this matter to the
Maine Superior Court, that party must do so within 60 days of receiving this decision.

Issued by the Board: March 17, 2017
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